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AN UNFULFILLED PROMISE: SECTION 1557’S
FAILURE TO EFFECTIVELY CONFRONT
DISCRIMINATION IN HEALTHCARE

ABSTRACT
When the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act passed, it
offered a broad promise to provide access to quality care on a nondiscriminatory basis.1 To achieve nondiscrimination, Congress included
Section 1557, which integrated the nondiscrimination protections
granted under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the
Education Amendments, Section 504, and the Age Discrimination Act.
The language of the statute has proved that the section cannot achieve
its broad promise. Covering only intentional discrimination and usually interpreted to divide the standard so that intersectional discrimination cannot be redressed, Section 1557 fails to address
discrimination in a way that could effectively reduce health disparities and improve overall health outcomes. While it is possible to
interpret the statute to provide for an intersectional claim, the limit
to only intentional discrimination narrows the scope such that expanding Section 1557’s reach is necessary but not sufficient to improve
the health of marginalized communities. As evidenced during the
COVID-19 pandemic, implicit bias and disparate impact discrimination has a real impact in actual life and death healthcare decisions,
for which the consequences must have an available remedy. Section
1557 opens the door to a broader approach but remains passive as
a ‘nondiscrimination’ clause. Any further efforts to improve health
outcomes and reduce health discrimination must take an active and
intersectional ‘antidiscrimination’ approach.
INTRODUCTION
I. APPLICATIONS OF SECTION 1557 OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION
AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
A. Is There a Private Right of Action Under Section 1557?
B. Application of Section 1557 Before the 2016 Final
Regulations
C. Administrative Battles: Which Interpretation Fits Best?
II. WHY A NEW, SINGLE HEALTH DISCRIMINATION STANDARD IS
NECESSARY
A. A Divided Section 1557 Does Not Adequately Address
Real-Life Healthcare Experiences
1. See OFF. OF C.R., Fact Sheet: HHS Finalizes ACA Section 1557 Rule (June 12, 2020).
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B.

Intersectionality and a Single Health Antidiscrimination
Standard
C. Intersectionality in Healthcare
III. THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC
A. Discrimination by Design: Crisis Standards of Care
B. Discrimination Without Direction
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) brought many changes to healthcare in the United States.2 Not only enabling over twenty million
more people to access health insurance in 2016,3 the ACA guaranteed
coverage for preventive services, expanded coverage for young adults,
and set new expectations of transparency.4 In addition to these
groundbreaking reforms, the ACA brought an opportunity to combat
health discrimination and the resulting health disparities with new
force in Section 1557.5 Section 1557 states that “an individual shall
not . . . be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under, any health program or activity, any part of which is receiving Federal financial assistance” on the
basis of race, color, national origin, sex, disability, or age.6 Modeled
after the prohibition against discrimination in Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, this nondiscrimination clause extended protection
to four protected classes in a single swoop.7 But the reality of Section
1557’s impact on healthcare discrimination has been underwhelming.
The statute provided the opportunity to consider the healthcare
experiences of four protected classes in one action. It appeared to
recognize the complex reality of healthcare and human nature: that
a single person can occupy all four of those protected classes at once
2. Summary of Coverage Provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (July 17, 2012) [hereinafter Summary of Coverage], https://
www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/summary-of-coverage-provisions-in-the-patient
[https://perma.cc/3EV3-SGQ6].
3. The Uninsured and the ACA: A Primer—Key Facts About Health Insurance and
the Uninsured Amidst Changes to the Affordable Care Act, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 25,
2019), https://www.kff.org/report-section/the-uninsured-and-the-aca-a-primer-key-facts
-about-health-insurance-and-the-uninsured-amidst-changes-to-the-affordable-care-act
-how-many-people-are-uninsured [https://perma.cc/M7M4-NGW8].
4. Summary of Coverage, supra note 2.
5. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376
(May 18, 2016).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2010) (codifying Section 1557 of the ACA in the United
States Code).
7. See id.
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and be targeted for any and all of those identities in a given healthcare encounter.8 Section 1557 has failed to successfully address
these kinds of discrimination, though. Key to understanding the
way Section 1557 has failed in fulfilling its goal of nondiscrimination in healthcare is understanding the principles behind identity
and the power principles at play when marginalized communities
experience discrimination.9
Intersectionality guides understanding the whole person and
the privileges and challenges with which they live.10 It is a powerful
tool for interpreting human dynamics and is vital to understanding
the social structures behind health disparity data.11 Sociologist and
lawyer, Kimberlé Crenshaw, derived the theory from dynamic Black,
Indigenous, and “third-world” feminist and queer theories to foster
a “post-colonial” way of thinking about identity and society.12 Rather
than merely considering singular characteristics, such as one’s race,
sex, or socioeconomic status, intersectionality recognizes the composite
result of all such factors.13 Intersectionality allows a level of nuanced
discussion that is often left out of conversations on injustice.14
Crenshaw’s theory recognizes that the experience of a white
woman is different from the experience of a Black woman, and that
where a white woman faces gender discrimination, she does not also
face race-based discrimination, and a Black woman likely faces both.15
Intersectionality embraces a person’s whole experience and limits
population homogenization.16 The theory further embraces a more
complex understanding of the balance of power within society itself.17 Social structures distribute power and our interactions with
those structures determine our experiences.18 These social structures could be as near as the make-up of the family or as distant as
the laws passed by governments.19
If those institutions foster discrimination, the consequences will
pervade the whole society as power gets distributed across those
who are bound to that institution.20 Each person’s composite identity
8. See Anuj Kapilashrami & Olena Hankivsky, Intersectionality and Why it Matters
to Global Health, 391 THE LANCET: COMMENT 2589, 2589 (2018).
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Kapilashrami & Hankivsky, supra note 8, at 2589.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. See Kapilashrami & Hankivsky, supra note 8, at 2589.
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determines how severely a discriminatory policy will impact their
lives and that power dynamic determines future policies.21 Although
recent years have brought more awareness to cultural differences
and attempted to reduce barriers, the result has often been a shallow rise of cultural competency, rather than full-throttle attempts
to address the deep-seated institutional issues that perpetuate discrimination in the long term.22 For example, the 2019 National
Healthcare Quality and Disparities Report provides important insight
into the disparities between races in areas such as patient safety,
effectiveness of care, and patient-centered care, but it lacks the deeper
analysis of how those health disparities reflect larger social inequality.23 The report includes some measures that impact women and
other vulnerable populations, and looks at each care measure based
on geography and income.24 It remains unidimensional; it fails to look
at how each of these factors overlay with the others to reflect the
shameful and compounding realities of subjugation and oppression
in this country which perpetuate these health disparities.
Although Section 1557 does afford some additional legal protection
and remedy for those who experience discrimination in healthcare,
the recent COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates how much work remains in healthcare reform to truly combat health discrimination
and disparities.25 Both implicit and explicit discrimination pervade
the pandemic experience; from the infection and death rates, to the
day-to-day encounters of patients whose doctors refuse to believe
them, even to the ways that states across the country prepared for
crisis care.26 Continuing on in a system that perpetually fails to
21. See id. at 2590.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RSCH. & QUALITY, NAT’L HEALTHCARE
QUALITY & DISPARITIES REP., at Table 1: Patient Safety Measures Black vs. White (2019)
[hereinafter AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE].
24. See, e.g., id. at Table 1: Patient Safety Measures Black vs. White, Table 8: PersonCentered Care Asian vs. White, Table 15: Care Coordination Measures NPHI vs. White,
Table 30: Patient Safety Measures for Poor vs. High Income, Table 62: Affordable Care
Measures for Large Central Metro Area vs. Large Fringe Metro Area.
25. Tonya Russell, Racism in Care Leads to Health Disparities, Doctors and Other
Experts Say as They Push for Change, WASH. POST (July 11, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/health/racism-in-care-leads-to-health-disparities-doctors-and
-other-experts-say-as-they-push-for-change/2020/07/10/a1a1e40a-bb9e-11ea-80b9-40
ece9a701dc_story.html [https://perma.cc/YSM5-JGK9]; Racial Data Dashboard, THE
COVID TRACKING PROJECT AT THE ATLANTIC [hereinafter THE COVID TRACKING PROJECT],
https://covidtracking.com/race/dashboard [https://perma.cc/9ZLD-S45T] (last visited
Dec. 6, 2021).
26. Joseph Shapiro, People with Disabilities Fear Pandemic Will Worsen Medical
Biases, NPR (Apr. 15, 2020, 5:00 AM) [hereinafter Shapiro I], https://www.npr.org/2020
/04/15/828906002/people-with-disabilities-fear-pandemic-will-worsen-medical-biases
[https://perma.cc/N4TD-TU29].
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recognize and actively uproot discrimination in healthcare disregards
the depth of disparity that multiple marginalized patients face.27
Part I considers how Section 1557 has been interpreted since it
passed in 2010. First without supporting regulations as courts attempted to piece together the statutory intent, then with regulations
that changed between the Obama and Trump Administrations. Part
II discusses the need for a single healthcare discrimination standard, and how an intersectional approach is the most appropriate way
to combat discrimination that creates poorer health outcomes for
marginalized patients in health systems across the United States.
Finally, Part III discusses discrimination during the coronavirus pandemic. Addressing both state initiatives and doctor-patient interactions to demonstrate the inadequacy of the current system, this section
concludes that any further efforts toward healthcare reform must
reach much further than Section 1557.
I. APPLICATIONS OF SECTION 1557 OF THE PATIENT
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA) in 2010.28 Section 1557 is one of the provisions within the
ACA that became effective even before HHS promulgated regulations.29 HHS did not release final rules regarding Section 1557 until
2016.30 These regulations clarified the scope of the statute’s reach
and how the HHS Office of Civil Rights would interpret and enforce
Section 1557.31 While important to defining the boundaries of the
law, the regulations cannot define whether a private right of action
exists under the statute.32 To enforce Section 1557 on an individual
level, there must be congressional intent to create a private right of
action paired with a private remedy.33 Where there is no congressional
intent, “a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create
one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or
27. See Kapilashrami & Hankivsky, supra note 8, at 2590.
28. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1557 (2010).
29. MaryBeth Musumeci, Jennifer Kates, Lindsey Dawson, Alina Salganicoff, Laurie
Sobel & Samantha Artiga, The Trump Administration’s Final Rule on Section 1557 NonDiscrimination Regulations Under the ACA and Current Status, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/the-trump
-administrations-final-rule-on-section-1557-non-discrimination-regulations-under-the-aca
-and-current-status [https://perma.cc/7C53-CUP4].
30. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,376
(May 18, 2016).
31. Id. at 31,376.
32. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001).
33. See id. at 286.
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how compatible with the statute.”34 This section explores whether
a private right of action exists under Section 1557, how courts interpreted the section before regulations, and, finally, how the Obama
and Trump Administrations interpreted the section differently.
A. Is There a Private Right of Action Under Section 1557?
The restriction of creative power to Congress does not preclude
implied causes of action.35 For example, in Alexander v. Sandoval,
the Court determined that there is no private right of action to enforce discrimination that disparately impacts certain racial groups
under Title VI, but the Court simultaneously reaffirmed Title VI’s
implied right of action against intentional discrimination on the
basis of race.36 An indicator for Congressional intent is whether the
language of the statute “mak[es] the would-be plaintiff ‘a member
of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted’” or whether
the language suggests that enforcement lies in the hands of a government agency.37
Section 1557, like many nondiscrimination clauses, mimics the
language used in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.38 It grounds
the right with the person experiencing discrimination, with language of “an individual shall not . . . be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under,
any health program or activity, any part of which is receiving Federal
financial assistance.”39 This language anchors the right with the
individual and places the potential plaintiff in a series of protected
34. Id. at 286–87.
35. See, e.g., id. at 297 (reaffirming a previous holding that there was no doubt
whether Congress intended to create an implied private cause of action under Title VI).
36. Id. at 281, 293 (holding that private rights of action exist against the specifically
proscribed discrimination and limiting interpretations to intentional discrimination).
37. See id. at 290.
38. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (1964) (“No person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance”), with 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1986) (“No person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance”), and 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2015) (“No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or
under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States
Postal Service”), and 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1975) (“[N]o person in the United States shall, on
the basis of age, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under, any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance”).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2010).
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classes.40 Where Section 1557 differs from other nondiscrimination
statutes, is where it integrates “the ground[s] prohibited under” four
pre-existing nondiscrimination statutes (Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments, Section 504,
and the Age Discrimination Act) to define the contours of nondiscrimination in healthcare.41
In some ways, Section 1557 merely reflects the current state of
nondiscrimination law in the United States,42 wherein the integrated statutes reflect the implied right of action derived from the
language in Title VI.43 From that existing framework, Courts have
developed the boundaries of each protected class’ enforcement
mechanisms.44 Section 1557 creates an implied right of action that
integrates existing systems to reach a new realm of protection—
health programs and activities.45 Where the pre-existing statutes
are integrated, both procedure and remedies are incorporated.46 This
means that there are limits imposed on what a plaintiff can bring
based on what bases of discrimination they allege, and also limits
on what kinds of remedies they may seek.47 It is beyond the scope of
this Note to review all rights and burdens under each integrated
statute. Importantly, though, the four pre-existing statutes predominantly require a showing of intentional discrimination.48
Considering that the overarching purpose of the ACA is “to ensure
that health services are available broadly on a nondiscriminatory
basis,”49 interpreting Section 1557 to merely extend existing law to
the healthcare arena is not sufficient to combat pervasive health
disparities, which can result from both intentional and disparate
impact discrimination.50
40. See Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Gilead Sci. Inc., 102 F. Supp. 3d 688, 698
(2015).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2010).
42. See Briscoe v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 281 F. Supp. 3d 725, 727 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
43. See Gilead, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 698.
44. See id.; see, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292–99 (1985).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2010).
46. See Gilead, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 698.
47. See id.
48. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001) (“Title VI itself reach[es]
only instances of intentional discrimination” and “Title IX created a private right of
action to enforce a ban on intentional discrimination”) (internal quotations omitted). But
see Choate, 469 U.S. at 299 (“While we reject the boundless notion that all disparateimpact showings constitute prima facie cases under § 504, we assume without deciding
that § 504 reaches at least some conduct that has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon
the [disabled][.]”).
49. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,379
(May 18, 2016).
50. See, e.g., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE, supra note 23, at Table 20: Care Coordination
Measures for AI/AN vs. White (showing that American Indian/Alaska Natives experience
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B. Application of Section 1557 Before the 2016 Final Regulations
After finding that there is a private right of action, HHS had to
promulgate regulations to assist in interpreting how integrated the
existing statutes would be, and defining the terms that Congress left
to the agency.51 Initially, HHS moved slowly, so courts interpreted the
ambiguous section on their own and found divergent applications.52
The confusion over the extent to which the ACA established a single
‘health discrimination’ test that applies to discrimination on the
basis of any grounds identified in the integrated civil rights legislation has dulled the clause’s promise.53
The ACA promised to bring nondiscriminatory healthcare to the
United States,54 but failed to recognize just how common those experiences are, and how much they contribute to health disparities.
Discrimination permeates all elements of healthcare and is reflected
in basic health statistics: the Black infant mortality rate is twice
that of white infants, there is a lack of referrals to specialists for Black
patients, and Black women’s pain is regularly ignored even though
it may be indicative of more serious diseases.55
Under the divided readings, the protections against discrimination differed depending on which court the plaintiff brought their
lawsuit in.56 For example, in 2015, a Black woman whose pain was
ignored may, or may not, have been able to redress the full extent of
her injury under Section 1557 depending on her jurisdiction. If the
court followed the reasoning in the unreported Rumble v. Fairview
Health Services opinion, the woman could enforce the nondiscrimination law on the grounds that she experienced discrimination based on
her race and her sex.57 If the court followed the reasoning in Briscoe
v. Health Care Service Corporation, on the other hand, a Black woman
might be forced to select between her two identities, even though
poorer care-coordination, including poorer communication of discharge instructions and
staff disregarding preferences for treatment upon discharge).
51. See OFF. OF C.R., supra note 1.
52. Compare Rumble v. Fairview Health Services, No. 14-CV-2037, 2015 WL 1197415,
at *2 (D. Minn. 2015) (finding a single intersectional health discrimination claim, that
integrates only the grounds for discrimination that are prohibited in the statutes integrated into Section 1557, and subjects the claim to a single test), with Briscoe, 281 F.
Supp. 3d at 728 (finding that each statute integrated into Section 1557 also brings its
own tests, remedies, burdens, and procedures).
53. Compare Rumble, 2015 WL 1197415, at *2, with Briscoe v. Health Care Serv.
Corp., 281 F. Supp. 3d 725, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
54. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,376
(May 18, 2016).
55. Russell, supra note 25.
56. Compare Rumble, 2015 WL 1197415, at *10, with Briscoe, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 738.
57. See Rumble, 2015 WL 1197415, at *12.
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each played a part in the discriminatory denial of appropriate medical
care.58 Such a division of herself is impossible and is not truly reflective of the treatment she received, particularly considering that the
end result of the discriminatory treatment is the same: she experiences poorer health outcomes after being denied care or after care
is delayed.
Understanding how discrimination results in poorer health outcomes is vital to addressing health disparities, but that by no means
makes it a simple task. There are several layers to the analysis, as
Rumble indicates.59 Before Rumble, no other court interpreted the
integration language within Section 1557.60 Section 1557 sets out
that “an individual shall not [be discriminated against] on the ground
prohibited under [T]itle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . [T]itle
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 . . . the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 . . . or [S]ection 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.”61 Each of the integrated statutes provides distinct grounds for
which discrimination is prohibited.62 The court, recognizing the ambiguity in the integration of the four statutes, questioned how a plaintiff could use the statutes under Section 1557 where each uses a
different standard for liability, causation, and different burdens of
proof.63 The court determined that Section 1557 must be interpreted
as a whole, and that Congress intended to create a single healthspecific nondiscrimination standard.64
The judge in Rumble, Judge Susan Nelson, recognized that any
reading providing multiple standards would diffuse Section 1557’s
impact on discrimination in healthcare.65 In particular, Judge Nelson
noted that “different enforcement mechanisms and standards would
apply to a Section 1557 plaintiff depending on whether the plaintiff’s
claim is based on her race, sex, age, or disability.”66 Such a reading
would mean that the ignored Black woman from above would have
different requirements under the law than a white woman who
experienced discrimination based on her sex and sexual orientation,
despite both women filing claims under Section 1557.67 Finding that
an interpretation that retains each statute’s standards precludes
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Briscoe, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 738.
Rumble, 2015 WL 1197415, at *9–19.
Id. at *9.
42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2010).
Rumble, 2015 WL 1197415, at *10.
Id.
See id. at *11.
See id.
Id.
See id.
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intersectional claims and leaves the court with little guidance,
Judge Nelson held that the four laws provide only the bases for the
prohibition on discrimination, but that one standard of proof applied
to all Section 1557 plaintiffs.68
By contrast, the District Court in Briscoe considered the reasoning in Rumble and rejected the single standard reading.69 Despite
the HHS Office of Civil Rights’ (OCR) support for the Rumble interpretation of Section 1557, the Briscoe court found more persuasive
those cases that held that retention of the distinct enforcement
mechanisms of each statute is more aligned with Congressional
intent.70 The court found that “[i]f Congress intended for a single
standard . . . [then] repeating the references to the civil-rights
statutes and expressly incorporating their distinct enforcement
mechanisms would have been a pointless (and confusing) exercise.”71
Indeed, the court recognized that the incorporation established the
perimeter of prohibited discrimination, but extended it “to establish
the enforcement mechanisms available under the ACA for different
discrimination claims.”72 This holding is logical to an extent, but is
hindered where plaintiffs generally could already reach intentional
discrimination in many healthcare settings—even if the ACA did not
exist—by virtue of the “any program or activity receiving Federal
funds” language in each integrated statute.73 So, a Black disabled74
individual facing intentional healthcare discrimination could have
sought redress under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or Section 504.75
68. Rumble, 2015 WL 1197415, at *12.
69. Briscoe v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 281 F. Supp. 3d 725, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. Some of the statutes do have limiting language that restricts the areas in which
they are active. For example, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is active in employment only on rare occasions, even if the employer receives federal funding, because
of language that ultimately directs potential plaintiffs to Title VII to resolve disputes via
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt,
Title IX and Title VII: Parallel Remedies in Combatting Sex Discrimination in Educational
Employment, 102 MARQUETTE L. REV. 701, 714 (2019). Some circuits follow similar reasoning in interpreting Title IX, which is already limited to education, and find that although
it may operate in employment, Title VII procedures are more appropriate because otherwise Title IX can serve as a bypass to the administrative requirements under Title VII.
Id. at 715–17.
74. There is some discussion over whether person-first or identity-first language is
most appropriate when discussing a disability. This Note uses identity-first language,
including the term “disabled.” Understanding the argument against using identity-first
language and the preconceptions that it may bring, any stigmas or harms attached to the
term “disabled” are based on society’s own stereotyping of disabled individuals. Since
“disabled” is merely a descriptive term and any connotation assigned to it is assigned
from the reader, this Note uses identity-first language.
75. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293–98 (1985) (holding that Title VI reached
only intentional discrimination and that Section 504 could reach disparate impact

2022]

AN UNFULFILLED PROMISE

497

It is merely repetition of existing law to place a list of civil rights
statutes within the ACA without an active intention of integration
to create an intersectional cause of action that operates under a single
standard. Though it may clarify applicability, the practical effect of
such a repetition is essentially null. Those people who would have
brought claims able to withstand the existing challenging tests, presumably, would have brought and succeeded on their cases, ACA or
no ACA. Applying Section 1557 as the Briscoe court commands adds
little to the fight against health disparities.
C. Administrative Battles: Which Interpretation Fits Best?
The conflicting interpretations seen in the courts above, are also
present in regulations. The Obama Administration’s initial regulations
clearly addressed a single right of action for plaintiffs seeking to redress discrimination in a healthcare setting.76 The final regulations,
released in 2016, interpreted the statute to integrate each of the
civil rights statutes’ enforcement mechanisms, stating that the
“mechanisms provided for and available under” each of the incorporated statutes “shall apply for purposes of . . . Section 1557.”77 The
regulations further provide that “[c]ompensatory damages for violations of Section 1557 are available in appropriate administrative
and judicial actions.”78 This combination of statements settled the
question of whether any of the enforcement opportunities available
outside of Section 1557 litigation could be available to the Section
1557 plaintiff.79
The regulations did not interpret the section without limitation,
though, because they did not go so far as Rumble to apply a single
burden to discrimination in healthcare on the different prohibited
bases of discrimination.80 Rather, the regulations aligned with Briscoe,
which retained the standards under each individual law while attempting to combine them into a single Section 1557 claim.81 The rule
established that nothing in Section 1557 or the regulations “shall be
construed to apply a lesser standard for the protection of individuals
discrimination; requiring the defendants be recipients of federal funds and explaining that
the promise of nondiscrimination law is not the same outcome, but the same opportunities).
76. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,376
(May 18, 2016).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Allison M. Tinsey, Regulating Relief: Private Right of Action Jurisprudence in
Healthcare Discrimination Cases, 20 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 305, 312 (2017).
80. See id.
81. See Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,472
(May 18, 2016).
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from discrimination than the standards applied” under the four integrated statutes.82 Under this interpretation, the Section 1557
plaintiff would bring a single claim under 1557.83 If the individual
faced intersectional discrimination during a single health encounter,
the individual’s age discrimination evidence would have to meet the
standard under the Age Discrimination Act, and the individual’s
race discrimination evidence would have to meet the Title VI standards.84 These rules caused terrible confusion and led to overly
complex and ineffective litigation.85
The overarching mission of the ACA is to increase access to
quality healthcare.86 While nondiscrimination protections make no
guarantee to the same outcomes, as Justice Marshall explained in
Alexander v. Choate, they do guarantee the opportunity to attain
those outcomes.87 Access is not improved if marginalized and multiple marginalized individuals across the nation still distrust medical
providers, avoid healthcare, or fear seeking treatment because of
discrimination.88 Such avoidance only further perpetuates severity
of illness and increases disparities.89 Restructuring institutions to
facilitate more diverse patients is a complex process, but one of
those steps should be nondiscrimination protections with teeth, particularly considering the severe consequences often at stake in a
healthcare setting.90
The Trump Administration promulgated its own rules interpreting Section 1557 and removed many of the protections enforced
by the previous administration.91 Where the Obama Administration
included gender identity and sexual orientation as protected from discrimination on the basis of sex, the Trump Administration excluded
those identities from protection.92 The new regulations also moved
82. Id. at 31,466.
83. Tinsey, supra note 79, at 314.
84. See id. at 312.
85. See OFF. OF C.R., supra note 1.
86. See Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,462
(May 18, 2016).
87. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 305 (1985).
88. See April Dembosky, ‘All You Want Is to Be Believed’: Sick with COVID-19 and
Facing Racial Bias in the ER, NPR (Oct. 21, 2020, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/sec
tions/health-shots/2020/10/21/915084127/all-you-want-is-to-be-believed-sick-with-covid
-19-and-facing-racial-bias-in-the-#:~:text=From-,’All%20You%20Want%20Is%20To%
20Be%20Believed’%3A%20Sick%20With,Racial%20Bias%20In%20The%20ER&text=
Kenneth%20Eke%2FCode2040-,Karla%20Monterroso%20says%20after%20going%20
to%20Alameda%20Hospital%20in%20May [https://perma.cc/6GMJ-AE6K].
89. See id.
90. Kapilashrami & Hankivksy, supra note 8, at 2590–91.
91. See Nondiscrimination Requirements, 45 C.F.R. § 92.2 (2020); OFF. OF C.R., supra
note 1.
92. OFF. OF C.R., supra note 1.
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further away from an interpretation that allows for intersectional
claims.93 The new rules required courts to follow “the longstanding
enforcement structure for each civil rights statute identified in Section 1557.”94 Such an interpretation removes the partially integrated
system established under the 2016 regulations, and instead substitutes a mere recitation of the applicability of prior civil rights laws
in the healthcare setting.95 The Biden Administration has announced
that these rules will not continue during his term.96
Still, Section 1557 protection greatly diminished under the Trump
Administration’s enforcement approach because it removed new protections for some patient-plaintiffs and effectively extinguished the
possibility of an intersectional claim.97 Given that “a fundamental
purpose of the ACA is to ensure that health services are available
broadly on a nondiscriminatory basis,” such curtailing of patient
rights cannot conform with the law’s purpose nor achieve much
progress reducing health disparity.98
II. WHY A NEW, SINGLE HEALTH DISCRIMINATION
STANDARD IS NECESSARY
There is no doubt that the simplest solution to the ambiguity in
Section 1557 is essentially what the Trump Administration did: interpret it as merely extending the domain of each pre-existing statute
into healthcare.99 Such an interpretation, however, is inappropriate
and does not conform with the intent behind Section 1557 or the ACA
as a whole.100 This intent, to improve healthcare access through nondiscriminatory care,101 is vital to improving healthcare outcomes.
Section 1557, however, likely is not the vehicle to ever achieve that
goal. This section assesses the ways Section 1557, currently operating as a divided standard, fails to adequately address discrimination
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. See id.; Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at
31,472 (May 18, 2016).
96. MaryBeth Musumeci, Lindsey Dawson, Laurie Sobel & Jennifer Kates, Recent and
Anticipated Actions to Reverse Trump Administration Section 1557 Non-Discrimination
Rules, KFF (June 9, 2021), https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief
/recent-and-anticipated-actions-to-reverse-trump-administration-section-1557-non-dis
crimination-rules [https://perma.cc/T4F8-WVBV].
97. See OFF. OF C.R., supra note 1.
98. See Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,379
(May 18, 2016).
99. See OFF. OF C.R., supra note 1.
100. See Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,410,
31,462 (May 18, 2016).
101. Id.
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taking place in healthcare settings today. It goes on to assess the
value of an intersectional approach, and how a single, intersectional
health discrimination standard built on the foundations of Section
1557 is more appropriate for modern needs.
A. A Divided Section 1557 Does Not Adequately Address Real-Life
Healthcare Experiences
Broadly, Congress framed Section 1557 with language similar
to that within the pre-existing statutes.102 The pre-existing nondiscrimination statutes state that “no person shall be . . . discriminated
against . . . [in] any program or activity . . . receiving Federal financial assistance.”103 It is true that even with such a broad statement,
there are some limitations on each statutes’ reach. For example,
there is dispute over whether Title IX always reaches employment
situations, because of its crossover with Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.104 If Title IX reaches all employment situations, then a
plaintiff could bypass administrative exhaustion and caps on damages.105 Some argue that since Title IX came after Title VII, Congress would have stated if it intended there to be any preemptive
effect.106 This logic implies that Congress’s not stating a preemptive
effect means that Title IX is intended to have some different application and interpretation than Title VII.107 This argument can extend
to the question of whether Section 1557 integrates only the broader
concepts of the integrated statutes and creates a single, intersectional health discrimination cause of action.
First, the inclusion of the disclaimer in Section 1557(b), that
nothing in Section 1557 is intended to alter the interpretation of the
original pre-existing statutes, implies that the statute is intended to
pave its own way in nondiscrimination law.108 Second, Section 1557
came after each of the incorporated civil rights statutes, and uses language that both creates its own implied private right of action109 and
limits the impact of the new right of action on the interpretation of the
existing laws in other contexts.110 If Congress intended Section 1557
102. See supra note 38.
103. See id.
104. Zehrt, supra note 73, at 715–17.
105. Id. at 716–17.
106. Id. at 724.
107. See id. at 723–24.
108. See 42 U.S.C. § 18116(b) (2010).
109. See Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Gilead Sci. Inc., 102 F. Supp. 3d 688,
698–99 (2015).
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 18116(b) (2010).
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to merely be an add-on to the existing laws, it would not have included such language that triggers an intent to establish stronger
protections on their own path in American nondiscrimination law.111
By the same reasoning that supports the argument that Title IX is
intended to have some different application in employment than
Title VII, it is logical that Section 1557 must have some different
application than the integrated statutes operating on their own,
namely, the creation of an intersectional plaintiff.112
Next, the 2016 regulations partially integrated the civil rights
legislation into a single claim but maintained different burdens for
each aspect of that claim.113 Requiring different burdens for a single
integrated claim in such a way is illogical. It forces selection of legal
and factual theories that may not be fully reflective of the discrimination that the individual faced to avoid compromising the burden
under one standard or another.114 This pressure is particularly inappropriate because failure to meet either burden could potentially
defeat the entire Section 1557 claim.115 It is unreasonable that
Congress would have intended that the Section be so self-defeating.
Moreover, despite different bases for discrimination, or cumulative and intersectional discrimination, in healthcare the total discrimination that a person experiences during an encounter has the
same result: deficient provision of care resulting in poorer health
outcomes.116 And poorer health outcomes resulting from discrimination perpetuates and widens health disparities.117 Applying different
tests for the different ways in which someone faces discrimination
in healthcare is inefficient and ineffective toward the ACA’s goals.118
In fact, applying different tests would likely reduce a patient-plaintiff’s
ability to give evidence on each basis of discrimination, given likely
challenges of relevance or issues with variable burdens of proof.119
Section 1557 prohibits discrimination on the basis of age, disability,
sex, race, color, or national origin in health programs that operate
in organizations receiving federal funding.120 A patient-plaintiff who
111. See Zehrt, supra note 73, at 724.
112. Id.
113. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,466
(May 18, 2016).
114. See Rumble v. Fairview Health Services, No. 14-CV-2037, 2015 WL 1197415, at
*11 (D. Minn. 2015).
115. See id.
116. See Russell, supra note 25.
117. See id.
118. See Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,466
(May 18, 2016).
119. See Rumble, 2015 WL 1197415, at *10–11.
120. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1557 (2010).
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faces discrimination in such a setting is entitled to seek redress for
discrimination on any and all of those discriminatory experiences,
and should not have to face the unnecessary legal barrier of having
to ‘pick an identity’ for a more successful claim.121
Health disparities are highly reflective of an individual’s social
identities, but data can be slow to catch up.122 Despite the constant
lag in data, in part because of physicians’ own hesitance to take steps
that would enable such monitoring,123 the impact of these characteristics on physician-patient interactions cannot be ignored. For example, considering the measure “adults who had a doctor’s office or
clinic visit in the last 12 months whose health providers sometimes
or never spent enough time with them,” the rate for white patients
in 2019 was 8.5% compared to 28.0% for American Indian/Alaska
Natives.124 The maternal mortality rate is a shocking example of how
race and gender intersect and how our current health system handles compounding marginalization.125 Based on data from 2014–2017,
the maternal mortality rate for white women was 13.4%.126 The rates
for Black women and American Indian/Alaska Native women were
41.7% and 28.3%, respectively.127 Healthcare providers cannot divorce
these women’s individual social identities from each other, so much
so that the combination of their identities may determine the future
of their families. If the providers responsible for the discrimination
cannot divorce the identities from each other, the system responsible for enforcing the remedy against that discrimination should not
divorce them either.
Finally, the very nature of Section 1557’s implied right of action128
creates a barrier that limits its ability to fully redress discrimination
121. See id.
122. See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, Gay and Transgender Patients to Doctors: We’ll Tell. Just
Ask., N.Y.TIMES (May 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/29/health/lgbt-patients
-doctors.html [https://perma.cc/GZS3-5M7D]; Perri Klass, The Impact of Disparities on
Children’s Health, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/15
/well/family/the-impact-of-disparities-on-childrens-health.html [https://perma.cc/L4Q6
-KQW7]; Jill Cowan, Californians Support Black Lives Matter and Wearing Masks, N.Y.
TIMES (July 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/29/us/california-coronavirus
-demographics.html [https://perma.cc/5NQ6-Y7PH].
123. See Hoffman, supra note 122.
124. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE, supra note 23, at Table 19: Person-Centered Care
Measures for AI/AN vs. White.
125. See Pregnancy Mortality Surveillance System, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENT.: REPROD.HEALTH, https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternal-mortality/preg
nancy-mortality-surveillance-system.htm [https://perma.cc/B5GQ-NQHN] (last visited
Dec. 6, 2021).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Gilead Sci. Inc., 102 F. Supp. 3d 688,
698–99 (2015).
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in healthcare and achieve its goals as set forth in the ACA.129 In modeling Section 1557 after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,130 the
implied right of action is likely limited only to instances of intentional
discrimination.131 Each of the integrated statutes is modeled after
Title VI,132 and each requires a showing of intentional discrimination before a plaintiff can recover.133 The exception is a claim for disability discrimination under Section 504, for which there may be
times that disparate impact claims are permitted.134 As such, if a
disabled patient brought a Section 1557 claim alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and race, despite being permitted to
show disparate disability discrimination, that intersectional claim
would likely collapse under the weight of the intentional discrimination burden.
B. Intersectionality and a Single Health Antidiscrimination
Standard
Nondiscrimination clauses will not be effective in combating the
daily discrimination that marginalized communities face until they
recognize and enforce against the multiple ways institutions perpetrate discrimination.135 The law must equip multiple marginalized
communities with the tools to fight against such oppression, otherwise, the “daily problems associated with intersectionality across any
combination of racial, class, gender, sexual orientation, language, or
disability systemic oppressions and discrimination, may . . . [be]
daunting.”136 Kimberlé Crenshaw is credited with exposing the ways
in which progress in the law has moved nondiscrimination forward,
while still holding it back.137 For example, at its core, the law operates within strict definitions, and American nondiscrimination laws
have defined sex discrimination and race discrimination around
129. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,379
(May 18, 2016).
130. See C.R. DIV., DEP’T OF JUST., TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL IV.1 (2021).
131. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001).
132. See C.R. DIV., DEP’T OF JUST., TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL; Introduction to the ADA,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. CIV. RTS. DIV. IV.1, https://www.ada.gov/ada_intro.htm [https://
perma.cc/6ZMM-3V9F] (last visited Dec. 6, 2021).
133. See Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Gilead Sci. Inc., 102 F. Supp. 3d 688, 701
(2015); C.R. DIV., DEP’T OF JUST., TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL IV.1, IX.1 (2021).
134. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299 (1985).
135. See Devon W. Carbado, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Vickie M. Mays & Barbara
Tomlinson, Intersectionality: Mapping the Movements of a Theory, 10 DU BOIS REV. 303,
304 (2013).
136. Nancy Lopez & Vivian L. Gadsden, Health Inequities, Social Determinants, and
Intersectionality, NAT’L ACAD. OF MED. 1, 3 (2016).
137. Id. at 5; Carbado et al., supra note 135, at 303–04.
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“prototypical representatives.”138 These representatives, white women
and Black men, respectively, focus advocacy and change around patriarchal and racist understandings of discrimination, thus limiting
the extent to which nondiscrimination can achieve its goal.139
In reality, people are much more complicated than is represented in much of the current nondiscrimination law. Until nondiscrimination law recognizes and adopts the nuances that exist within
society, the notion of more active ‘antidiscrimination’ will remain aspirational.140 Enforcement mechanisms like Section 1557 hold promise
to open the door to such intersectional application but will hold no
teeth if people are still forced to select single-identity enforcement.
C. Intersectionality in Healthcare
Health status is dependent upon both biological factors and social
determinants of health.141 Recently, there has been more research
that parses the two: what was once believed to be a biological factor
(e.g., race) is now understood to be a social construct that influences
biology only after a series of environmental and social exposures,
rather than a default biological difference.142 Despite this growing
understanding that these identity-based interruptions to our underlying biology are actually man-made,143 the information “has not
always shifted paradigms sufficiently to either disentangle intersectional inequities or tease apart the ways in which social factors
and structural barriers at once interlock to prevent meaningful and
sustainable change.”144 Despite knowing that it is people’s attitudes
and people-built institutions that are perpetuating discrimination and
harm, and thus the corollary that change in people’s attitudes and
change in people-built institutions could prevent that same discrimination and harm, we choose to perpetuate morally reprehensible
behavior and policies. These choices prevent actively combatting issues, such as health disparity, that are truly life and death decisions.
In healthcare, it is easy to blame poor health outcomes on
something the patient did (or did not do) against medical advice.145
138. Carbado et al., supra note 135, at 304.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See Lopez & Gadsden, supra note 136, at 1.
142. Vivian Chou, How Science and Genetics are Reshaping the Race Debate of the 21st
Century, HARV. BLOG (Apr. 17, 2017), http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/science-ge
netics-reshaping-race-debate-21st-century [https://perma.cc/T49K-3TTE]; Sarah McAfee,
Race Is a Social Construct, CTR. FOR HEALTH PROGRESS: BLOG (Oct. 24, 2017), https://cen
terforhealthprogress.org/blog/race-social-construct [https://perma.cc/8FSN-956Q].
143. Chou, supra note 142; McAfee, supra note 142.
144. Lopez & Gadsden, supra note 136, at 1.
145. See id. at 2–3.
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However, this “blame the victim” strategy avoids the tough questions and reflection on how providers may have adjusted their instructions to be more feasible considering that patient’s situation,
or even to merely reflect on the outright inequality that exists in the
United States.146 Focusing on an intersectional approach in health
equity forces providers and others in positions of power to “understand that every person’s experience is fundamentally different than
the experience of others, based on their unique identit[ies] and structural positions within systems of inequality.”147
It is well-known that some healthcare providers still struggle
to distinguish biological difference and socially constructed difference,
and the result is poor outcomes for marginalized communities.148 In
fact, many medical and nursing textbooks present racial or religious
difference in demeaning ways that may discourage providers from
asking pertinent diagnostic questions.149 Consequently, patients who
do not fit the archetype of the patient in whom the provider learned to
diagnose a disease or condition struggle to obtain an accurate diagnosis.150 The time has come to enable patients to redress the negative
outcomes that result from such misapplication of health principles.
Section 1557 opens the door to address these disparities using an
intersectional approach. As shown in Rumble, it is possible to interpret
the ambiguity in the statute to incorporate the basis of discrimination,
but not the processes or procedures of the integrated statutes.151 No
one holds only one identity. Rather, humans are composite creatures
and harms in healthcare should be treated as such. A uniform standard across Section 1557 would provide a vehicle for plaintiffs to redress their harms and could serve as an incentive for institutions to
work proactively to minimize discrimination before it happens. This
is a necessary but not sufficient step to the change needed to move
the U.S. system toward the ACA’s promise of healthcare equality.152
Though an intersectional interpretation of Section 1557 would move
us closer to course-correction, the recent data on the impact of
146. See id.
147. Id. at 5.
148. Russell, supra note 25.
149. See Rozina Sini, Publisher Apologises for ‘Racist’ Text In Medical Book, BBC
(Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-41692593 [https://perma.cc
/5URP-4ZQN].
150. Rose Eveleth, Medical Textbooks Overwhelmingly Use Pictures of Young White Men,
VICE (May 9, 2019, 9:30 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/3k3kkn/medical-textbooks
-overwhelmingly-use-pictures-of-young-white-men [https://perma.cc/2Q2S-HVM7].
151. Rumble v. Fairview Health Services, No. 14-CV-2037, 2015 WL 1197415, at *11
(D. Minn. 2015).
152. See Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,3179
(May 18, 2016).

506

WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.

[Vol. 28:487

COVID-19 illustrates the dire need for sweeping systemic change
beyond a broad application of Section 1557.153
III. THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC
The coronavirus pandemic drastically altered the world and what
many people thought possible. Not only did many people transition
to remote-only working and learning in a matter of weeks,154 but we
recently saw record-time approval of highly effective mRNA vaccines
to accelerate reaching herd immunity.155 While such an accomplishment should be celebrated, the damage from the virus in the year
leading to vaccination is one that will shape history.156 It took months
after the initial detection157 for the World Health Organization (WHO)
to officially declare COVID-19 a global pandemic, in March 2020.158
From the start, patients with the condition filled intensive care units
(ICUs), while experts scrambled to determine exactly how the virus
spread.159 In the time since, the disease has forever left its mark on
the U.S. healthcare system.
153. For state-by-state COVID-19 data, see THE COVID TRACKING PROJECT, supra
note 25.
154. Philippa Fogarty, Simon Frantz, Javier Hirschfeld, Sarah Keating, Emmanuel
Lafont, Bryan Lufkin, Rachel Mishael, Visvak Ponnavolu, Maddy Savage & Meredith
Turits, Coronavirus: How the World of Work May Change Forever, BBC, https://www
.bbc.com/worklife/article/20201023-coronavirus-how-will-the-pandemic-change-the-way
-we-work [https://perma.cc/P7J6-UG3R] (last visited Dec. 6, 2021).
155. See Pritish K. Tosh, Coronavirus: What is it and how can I protect myself?, MAYO
CLINIC (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/coronavirus/expert
-answers/novel-coronavirus/faq-20478727 [https://perma.cc/3QMN-FX99]; Katie Thomas,
Sharon LaFraniere, Noah Weiland, Abby Goodnough & Maggie Haberman, With F.D.A.
Approval, Pfizer Will Ship Millions of Vaccine Doses Immediately, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Dec. 15, 2020, 8:22 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/11/world/millions-of
-pfizer-vaccine-doses-to-be-shipped-immediately-after-fda-approval.html [https://perma
.cc/U6WF-8968].
156. For data reflecting both COVID-19 infections and deaths, see THE COVID
TRACKING PROJECT, supra note 25.
157. For information regarding initial discovery of the novel coronavirus, see Chris
Buckley, David D. Kirkpatrick, Amy Qin & Javier C. Hernández, 25 Days That Changed
the World: How Covid-19 Slipped China’s Grasp, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2020), https://www
.nytimes.com/2020/12/30/world/asia/china-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/EYF7-RBW8].
158. For information regarding the World Health Organization declaring a global
pandemic, see Tosh, supra note 155.
159. See Liz Kowalczyk, Who Gets a Ventilator? New Gut-Wrenching State Guidelines
Issued on Rationing Equipment, BOS. GLOBE (last updated Apr. 7, 2020, 2:49 PM), https://
www.bostonglobe.com/2020/04/07/metro/massachusetts-officials-release-plan-ration-venti
lators-icu-beds-if-need-arises [https://perma.cc/JYT6-S4W2]; Lauren Leatherby, John
Keefe, Lucy Tompkins, Charlie Smart & Mathew Conlen, ‘There’s No Place for Them to
Go’: I.C.U. Beds Near Capacity Across the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www
.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/12/09/us/covid-hospitals-icu-capacity.html?action=click
&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article [https://perma.cc/M4VP-QKLH].
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First, this section discusses how discrimination manifested during
the pandemic. This section first looks at discrimination through nonbinding guidance documents, called Crisis Standards of Care. Many
states put these documents into place in case their hospitals reached
maximum capacity but had to revise their guidance on account of discrimination. Second, this section assesses discrimination taking place
in stressed, but not rationing, hospitals. This section discusses how the
COVID-19 pandemic merely revealed the depth and severity of healthcare discrimination. The pandemic highlights the need for a strong
antidiscrimination statute that addresses intersectional discrimination to confront both intentional and disparate impact discrimination.
A. Discrimination by Design: Crisis Standards of Care
Discrimination has taken many forms throughout the coronavirus
pandemic.160 Black Lives Matter protests throughout the summer of
2020 made history fighting rampant police brutality and racial disparity in police killings.161 White Americans blamed Asian Americans
for the spread of the coronavirus, which included not only verbal
threats, but often violence.162 All while healthcare professionals, saddled with the burden of overflowing ICUs, attempted to sort out what
to do if they needed to ration care.163 Many states turned to ‘Crisis
Standards of Care’ (CSC).164
These documents intended to provide a guide for healthcare rationing during the pandemic in a fair, nondiscriminatory manner.165
Many missed the mark.166 Most have never been implemented, and
thus their protective provisions never put to the test.167 Rather,
160. Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the
Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/PM3V
-HKME]; Anna Purna Kambhampaty, ‘I Will Not Stand Silent.’ 10 Asian Americans
Reflect on Racism During the Pandemic and the Need for Equality, TIME (June 25, 2020,
6:32 AM), https://time.com/5858649/racism-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/3W2T-NNA4];
Elizabeth Pendo, COVID-19 and Disability-Based Discrimination in Health Care, AM.
BAR ASS’N (May 22, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/diversity/disabilityrights
/resources/covid19-disability-discrimination [https://perma.cc/8V9F-UHUU].
161. Buchanan et al., supra note 160.
162. Kambhampaty, supra note 160.
163. Pendo, supra note 160.
164. Evaluation Framework for Crisis Standard of Care Plans, CTR. FOR PUB. REPRESENTATION (updated Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.centerforpublicrep.org/wp-content/up
loads/Updated-evaluation-framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NDQ-VMYD].
165. Id.
166. For a compilation of HHS OCR complaints, advocacy letters, and other advocacy
efforts against discriminatory crisis standards of care, see CTR. FOR PUB. REPRESENTATION:
COVID-19, https://www.centerforpublicrep.org/covid-19 [https://perma.cc/KD7P-XYBF]
(last visited Dec. 6, 2021).
167. While many ICUs reached maximum capacity, most did not begin implementing
crisis care standards. At the end of 2020, though, Los Angeles and the surrounding
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decisions about day-to-day treatment have been left to physicians’
best judgment, without the nondiscriminatory CSC schema to guide
their triage.168
Crisis Standard of Care documents are protocols to assist physicians in the event that they must begin rationing life-saving treatment.169 The logic of these plans is to ensure that patients who are
most likely to survive the life-saving treatment are the ones who receive the treatment, ultimately aiming to ensure appropriate use of
limited resources.170 Early on, however, Disability Rights Washington
recognized that the State of Washington built its rationing plan from
disability-based distinctions, and that the plan was therefore illegally discriminatory.171 More and more advocates across the country
confronted their states’ rationing plans for the discrimination both
explicit and implicit within the plan, discriminating on the basis of
disability, race, age, and, in some cases, sex.172
In response, HHS Office of Civil Rights (OCR) released a bulletin announcing that it will enforce Section 1557 against covered
entities that discriminate in rationing plans and has since adjudicated many complaints.173 The strength of this statement has changed
over the course of the pandemic. When the novel coronavirus first
arrived in the United States, healthcare systems operated under the
counties’ health systems faced so much strain they began rationing care. For more
information on L.A.’s decision to ration care, see Leila Fadel, LA County Hospitals Begin
to Ration Care Amid Coronavirus Surge, NPR (Jan. 6, 2021, 5:08 AM), https://www.npr
.org/2021/01/06/953857303/la-county-hospitals-begin-to-ration-care-amid-coronavirus
-surge [https://perma.cc/GP9G-FDH2]. For more information about which ICUs reached
maximum capacity and rationing in general, see Leatherby et al., supra note 159, and
Will Stone, What It Means When Hospitals Say They Have to Ration Care, NPR (Nov. 23,
2020, 3:53 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/11/23/938131284/what-it-means-when-hos
pitals-say-they-have-to-ration-care [https://perma.cc/5EYU-FBJT].
168. Kowalczyk, supra note 159 (“ ‘These [guidelines] are obviously only used in disaster situations—situations we hope—and are working to ensure—do not happen,’ ”
Massachusetts Department of Public Health spokeswoman Ann Scales told the Boston
Globe in an email).
169. See CTR. FOR PUB. REPRESENTATION, supra note 164.
170. See CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, CALIFORNIA SARS-COV-2 PANDEMIC CRISIS CARE
GUIDELINES, 5 (June 2020), https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/CDPH%20
Document%20Library/COVID-19/California%20SARS-CoV-2%20Crisis%20Care
%20Guidelines%20-June%208%202020.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZY2-VV5W].
171. Disability Rts. Wash., Self Advocs. in Leadership, The Arc of the U.S., & Ivanova
Smith, Complaint Against the Wash. State Dep’t of Health, the N.W. Healthcare Response
Network and the Univ. of Wash. Med. Ctr. to the Off. for Civ. Rts. (Mar. 23, 2020), https://
www.disabilityrightswa.org/disability-discrimination-complaint-filed-over-covid-19-treat
ment-rationing-plan-in-washington-state [https://perma.cc/S5TE-WQ28].
172. For a compilation of HHS OCR complaints, advocacy letters, and other advocacy
efforts against discriminatory crisis standards of care, see CTR. FOR PUB. REPRESENTATION,
supra note 164.
173. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NON-DISCRIMINATION IN CRISIS STANDARDS
OF CARE, https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-providers/civil-rights-covid19/index.html
[https://perma.cc/CNQ6-LFJG].
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semi-integrated regulations that remained in place since the end of
the Obama Administration.174
Under these regulations, patients could bring a single ‘health
discrimination claim’ under Section 1557, but all procedures and
remedies under the integrated laws applied to whatever basis of
discrimination the patient-plaintiff claimed.175 Therefore, a patientplaintiff denied the use of a ventilator because of their pre-existing
disability, would be permitted to bring a health discrimination claim,
however, they would have to meet the burdens already provided
under Section 504.176 As the pandemic raged, however, the protections and meaning of Section 1557 changed.177 The Trump Administration regulations offered no protections for individuals who face
discrimination based on their sexual orientation or gender identity,
and the law acted as a mere extension of the pre-existing protections, provided in the integrated statutes, into the healthcare arena.178
While Section 1557, as it stands, does offer some additional protections than would have already been available, it is not as powerful
a tool as it could be in battling rampant discriminatory COVID-19
care.179 Moreover, discrimination is taking place in healthcare systems
across the country, without the rationing plans ever being invoked.180
B. Discrimination Without Direction
It is no secret that the coronavirus pandemic in the United States
has disproportionately impacted Black and Brown communities.181
Delayed data reporting on the disproportionate impact led to an
174. The novel Coronavirus was first officially detected in the United States on
January 22, 2020, so health systems operated under the Obama-era regulations for approximately seven months before the Trump Administration released its changes. For information about early COVID-19 detection in the United States, see Erin K. Stokes, Laura
D. Zambrano, Kayla N. Anderson, Ellyn P. Marder, Kala M. Raz, Suad El Burai Felix,
Yungfeng Tie & Kathleen E. Fullerton, Coronavirus Disease 2019 Case Surveillance—
United States, January 22–May 30, 2020, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENT.:
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. (June 19, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/vol
umes/69/wr/mm6924e2.htm [https://perma.cc/SN63-MAXQ] (reporting that the CDC recorded the first laboratory confirmed case of the novel coronavirus in the United States
on January 22, 2020). To evaluate the changes to the 1557 regulations during the summer
of 2020, compare 45 C.F.R. Subpart A with Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and
Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,375 (May 18, 2016).
175. See supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text.
176. Id.
177. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
178. See OFF. OF C.R., supra note 1.
179. For a summary of advocates’ strategies in fighting COVID care discrimination,
see Pendo, supra note 160.
180. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
181. THE COVID TRACKING PROJECT, supra note 25.
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incomplete picture of the damage the virus inflicted across the country.182 Even when demographic data rolled in, recognizing disparity
is challenging when it is “subtle and/or systemic resulting in underreporting of cases.”183 On several occasions, the differential treatment
that COVID-19 patients received made national headlines.184
In summer of 2020, while many disability advocates challenged
discriminatory CSC guidelines,185 Michael Hickson died of COVID19 in Texas.186 Mr. Hickson was a forty-six-year-old quadriplegic man,
and his death made headlines because his wife recorded a doctor explaining to her that the reason they did not pursue more intense
treatment was her husband’s “quality of life—he doesn’t have much
of one.”187 This is a medical provider making a decision about treatment, on the basis of his patient’s existing disability.188 The hospital
explained that the doctor misused the phrase “quality of life,” including that the medical team actually based the treatment decision
on existing sepsis and organ failure, neither of which the doctor in the
recording mentioned to Mrs. Hickson.189 Indeed, Mrs. Hickson claimed
that her husband had a quality of life; if anyone had asked him, he
would have wanted the intensive treatment so that he could live.190
Mrs. Hickson believed the doctors placed, “less value on her husband’s
life because he was a [B]lack man who was disabled.”191 Complicating matters, Mr. Hickson’s sister, herself a physician, agreed with the
decision that the hospital and Mr. Hickson’s medical guardian made
about treatment.192 She believes the doctors did all they could, and
182. Selena Simmons-Duffin, White House: Data on COVID-19 and Race Still Weeks
Away, NPR (Apr. 20, 2020, 1:36 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-up
dates/2020/04/20/838745546/white-house-data-on-covid-19-and-race-still-weeks-away
[https://perma.cc/LM98-VPS9].
183. Isaac Yeboah Addo, Double Pandemic: Racial Discrimination Amid Coronavirus
Disease 2019, 2 SOC. SCI. & HUMANITIES OPEN 1, 2 (2020) (emphasis added).
184. See, e.g., Joseph Shapiro, One Man’s COVID-19 Death Raises the Worst Fears of
Many People with Disabilities, NPR (July 31, 2020, 3:29 PM) [hereinafter Shapiro II],
https://www.npr.org/2020/07/31/896882268/one-mans-covid-19-death-raises-the-worst
-fears-of-many-people-with-disabilities [https://perma.cc/MU6H-ZZVV]; John Eligon, Black
Doctor Dies of COVID-19 After Complaining of Racist Treatment, N.Y. TIMES (last updated
Dec. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/23/us/susan-moore-black-doctor-indi
ana.html [https://perma.cc/9KWN-3VZD].
185. See Pendo, supra note 160.
186. Shapiro II, supra note 184; Ariana Eunjung Cha, Quadriplegic Man’s Death from
COVID-19 Spotlights Questions of Disability, Race and Family, WASH. POST (July 5, 2020,
9:40 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/07/05/coronavirus-disability
-death [https://perma.cc/RQ2E-MYLN].
187. Shapiro II, supra note 184.
188. See id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Cha, supra note 186.
192. Id.
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that they did not make decisions based on her brother’s race or
disabilities.193
This disagreement between medical providers, and even within
Mr. Hickson’s own family, draws attention to the areas where implicit
bias may be at play within the medical profession.194 While Mr.
Hickson’s providers may have done everything they could to treat him
appropriately, disabled patients consistently fight a system that seems
intent on dismissing them.195 In 2019, the National Council on Disability found that one of the primary ways that healthcare providers
and insurance companies discriminate against disabled patients is
in using ‘quality of life’ scores to determine whether a treatment is
appropriate—the exact method that the doctor expressed to Mrs.
Hickson.196 Mr. Hickson’s death is currently under investigation.197
In addition to disability fears, there are many instances in which
doctors have denied patients of color, particularly women of color,
appropriate COVID-19 care.198 In December 2020, Dr. Susan Moore
died of COVID-19 after raising alarms of her discriminatory treatment from white doctors at a hospital in Indianapolis.199 Dr. Moore,
a Black female physician, complained of intense pain to her white
male physician, who dismissed her complaints and mentioned discharging her.200 She explained in a Facebook post to a physicians’
group, “[h]e made me feel like I was a drug addict. . . . I put forth and
I maintain if I was white . . . I wouldn’t have to go through that.”201
Dr. Moore wrote that she had to beg for the antiviral drug remdesivir,202 and that she told her physician about her shortness of breath
but he did not believe her until he scanned her neck and lungs.203 In
a heartbreaking post, Dr. Moore explained, “[t]his is how Black people
get killed, when you send them home and they don’t know how to
fight for themselves.”204 Dr. Moore died two weeks after she posted
her initial video detailing her discrimination after acquiring bacterial pneumonia in addition to her COVID-19 pneumonia.205
193. Id.
194. See Shapiro I, supra note 26.
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. Shapiro II, supra note 184.
198. See, e.g., Eligon, supra note 184; Dembosky, supra note 88.
199. Eligon, supra note 184.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. For information about the effectiveness of antiviral drug remdesivir on the
duration of COVID-19 infection, see J.H. Beigel et al., Remdesivir for the Treatment of
COVID-19—Final Report, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1813, 1816 (2020).
203. Eligon, supra note 184.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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These stories of discriminatory COVID-19 care abound. By
December 2020, Black and Latinx people died of COVID-19 infection
at 3.6 times and 2.5 times the rate of white people, respectively.206
Karla Monterroso, a Latina woman who left the hospital initially
treating her COVID-19 infection for fear that the providers’ biases
would escalate her condition, explained, “[a]s women of color, you get
questioned a lot about your emotions and the truth of your physical
state. You get called an exaggerator a lot throughout the course of
your life . . . So there was this weird, ‘I don’t want to go and use
resources for nothing’ feeling.”207 It is in times of crisis that we
discover where our true values lie. For some, the Crisis Standards
of Care process and the data of racial disparity in COVID infections
and deaths are a revelation to the implicit and systemic discrimination in place throughout society. For the populations who live under
the stress of discrimination every day, the vulnerability accompanying the pandemic is distressing, but not a surprise.208
This is a problem that has always been present in the healthcare system, but never appropriately addressed in the legal system.209
The coronavirus pandemic offers an opportunity to turn a new corner
and embrace the full promise of antidiscrimination in healthcare.
Here, we learn not only from history, but also from the present. It is
time to accept full responsibility for the system’s failures up to this
point. At minimum, Section 1557 provides the building blocks to move
toward an antidiscrimination system that allows for intersectional
claims that will provide accountability to health systems that enable
providers who make women like Ms. Monterroso and Dr. Moore fear
for their lives.210
The most effective interpretation of the statute, as written, would
be that of Rumble, in which the Court found prohibition on intersectional discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, language,
sex, age, and disability.211 This creates a new ‘health discrimination’
claim, that has all of the remedies available to the patient-plaintiff that
would be available to a plaintiff under the integrated statutes.212
206. Id.
207. Dembosky, supra note 88.
208. See, e.g., Scott D. Halpern, Robert D. Truog & Franklin G. Miller, Cognitive Bias
and Public Health Policy During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 324 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 337,
337 (2020); Shapiro I, supra note 26; Julie Onos, Race and Medicine: The Cost of Medical
Bias When You’re Sick, Black, and Female, HEALTHLINE (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www
.healthline.com/health/the-cost-of-medical-bias-when-youre-sick-black-and-female#1
[https://perma.cc/C865-DBH9].
209. See supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., Eligon, supra note 184; Dembosky, supra note 88.
211. See Rumble v. Fairview Health Services, No. 14-CV-2037, 2015 WL 1197415, at
*11 (D. Minn. 2015).
212. See id.
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This approach is still limited, however, in that under Alexander v.
Sandoval, it is likely restricted only to ‘intentional discrimination.’213
Since healthcare discrimination, in crisis and out of crisis, is more
likely to be implicit than explicit, there must be an arm of health
antidiscrimination that applies to disparate-impact claims.214
As written, Section 1557 integrates the structure of Title VI, in
a way that is unlikely to be able to meet this requirement.215 Instead, as the United States continues to reflect on healthcare access
and learn from the pandemic, the goals must include more than
insurance access issues, and rather dive deeper to challenge settled
assumptions about healthcare behavior and uproot implicit biases
to truly combat health disparity.216 While issues of cost and insurance are areas that need reform to improve access and remove
barriers to care, those reforms are necessary but not sufficient to see
change in the quality of healthcare provided in the United States to
multiple marginalized populations. The new grace of being able to
see a physician does not improve health if that physician does not
treat their patient with the equal respect as their less marginalized
patients.
213. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
214. For information about how implicit health bias contributes to health disparities,
see William J. Hall, Mimi V. Chapman, Kent M. Lee, Yesenia M. Merino, Tainayah W.
Thomas, B. Keith Payne, Eugenia Eng, Steven H. Day & Tamera Coyne-Beasley, Implicit
Racial/Ethnic Bias Among Health Care Professionals and Its Influence on Health Care
Outcomes: A Systemic Review, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH e60, e60 (2015); Tori DeAngelis,
How Does Implicit Bias by Physicians Affect Patients’ Health Care?, 50 AM. PSYCH. ASS’N
(March 2019).
215. Compare supra text accompanying note 38, with 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2010) (“an
individual shall not . . . be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under, any health program or activity, any part of which
is receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”).
216. These goals did not significantly appear in conversations about healthcare reform
during the 2020 presidential election cycle. See Samantha Artiga, Kendal Orgera &
Olivia Pham, Disparities in Health and Health Care: Five Key Questions and Answers,
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy
/issue-brief/disparities-in-health-and-health-care-five-key-questions-and-answers
[https://perma.cc/VJC5-ZEJ6] (finding that many Democratic candidates for president
in the 2020 election cycle proposed healthcare reform options that further expanded
coverage gap, addressing access issues, and where they targeted racial and ethnic health
disparities, candidates focused namely on maternal health); see also JOE BIDEN: HEALTHCARE, https://joebiden.com/healthcare [https://perma.cc/4R77-JVPZ] (last visited Dec. 6,
2021) (supporting the Affordable Care Act and hoping to build on it, President Biden
offers a ‘public option’ that would expand access to those Americans whose incomes land
them in Medicaid coverage gaps. Focusing more specifically on the financial aspects of
healthcare reform, the President does address health equity for women’s access to reproductive medicine, plans to expand California’s strategies for reducing the high maternal
mortality rate for women of color, and seeks to reintegrate nondiscrimination protections
for gender identity and sexual orientation).
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CONCLUSION
The Affordable Care Act took on comprehensive healthcare reform in the United States.217 With it, many health measures have
improved, including access, guarantees of preventive health benefits, and better access to care for young adults.218 Each one of these
improvements has contributed to the overall improvement of health
disparity in the United States.219 But ten years from passage and six
years since implementation, the health disparities continue, and they
are shocking.220
The promise of accountability for differential treatment between
providers and patients with marginalized identities has yet to be
fulfilled. Section 1557 is but one step closer to the greater structural
reform necessary to begin recognizing the depth of discrimination’s
impact on healthcare provision.221 No person’s life experience can be
captured with a one-word identity label.222 How each person interacts with the power structures surrounding them is dependent upon
the different oppressions that person has had to endure throughout
the different stages of their life.223 Rather than placing an expectation on patients to only combat intentional discrimination,224 the
model must evolve to recognize disparate impact discrimination as
well. These disparately impacted patients are complex people who
deserve to make their whole case, and show how it is the harms in
response to the combination identities that make their experience
‘different’ that deserves remedy.225
To do this, there must be a single, intersectional health discrimination standard.226 Such a standard will force health providers and
systems to address deeper issues in diagnosis and treatment, and
incentivize greater institutional change to move beyond their mere
superficial and passive acknowledgment of ‘nondiscrimination’, toward
217. Summary of Coverage, supra note 2.
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., Health Coverage by Race and Ethnicity: The Potential Impact of the
Affordable Care Act, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health
-policy/issue-brief/health-coverage-by-race-and-ethnicity-the-potential-impact-of-the-af
fordable-care-act [https://perma.cc/JYC7-TS4P] (last visited Dec. 6, 2021).
220. See, e.g., Pregnancy Mortality Surveillance System, supra note 125.
221. See, e.g., text accompanying Russell, supra note 25; text accompanying Shapiro
II, supra note 184; text accompanying Eligon, supra note 184.
222. Kapilashrami & Hankivsky, supra note 8, at 2589.
223. Id.
224. See Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Gilead Sci. Inc., 102 F. Supp. 3d 688, 698
(2015).
225. Kapilashrami & Hankivsky, supra note 8, at 2589–90.
226. Rumble v. Fairview Health Services, No. 14-CV-2037, 2015 WL 1197415, at *11
(D. Minn. 2015).
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a more active ‘antidiscrimination.’227 It is only when the legal structure established to enforce against these discriminatory harms reflects
upon the ways in which it itself perpetuates discrimination that we
can achieve successful change.228 In healthcare, that begins with
recognizing that Section 1557’s expanded coverage of the pre-existing
nondiscrimination statutes to healthcare arenas is necessary but by
no means sufficient to tackle the shambolic attempts to combat health
disparities in the United States. Looking no further than the outright
devastation that the novel coronavirus has wrought on marginalized
communities during 2020229 and beyond, it is clear that shallow
acknowledgment can no longer stand in the place of active accountability structures and intersectional progress.
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